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1. Introduction 
“The Norwegian government and Statoil have undertaken an agreement to establish the 
world's largest full-scale CO2 capture and storage (CCS) project in conjunction with the 
projected combined heat and power plant at Mongstad.”  
Press release, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 12. October 2006 
 
This project, the importance of which the government compared to landing on the moon, has 
been heavily debated in recent months. Removing and storing the carbon dioxide (CO2) from 
gas-fired power plants represents a much cleaner way to produce electricity and make use of 
fossil fuels. This is a new and costly technology. There is a lot of uncertainty associated with 
these costs, and as it turns out – the Mongstad project will not be in the lower range of these 
costs.  The next chapter provides background information about climate change, carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) and the Mongstad project. 
 
How costly are these projects in general and this project in particular, assumed to be? What 
are the uncertainties related to these costs? What is the potential for CCS as a climate 
mitigation strategy? The third chapter is a discussion of the potential costs of this project. 
First, I will provide a bottom-up analysis of the costs of generating electricity from fossil 
fuels with and without CCS, and how various prices of carbon might affect the 
competitiveness of each technology. Then I compare different cost estimates of CCS from 
different sources. This is to get a rough understanding of the expected costs on CCS 
implemented on gas-fired power plants in general, although the costs are very uncertain and 
depends on project-specific factors. 
 
Ironically, Statoil and the government have already been involved in a financial scandal at 
Mongstad. The upgrading of the refinery in 1987 resulted in a huge budget deficit: 6 billion 
NOK (or approximately 1 billion USD). The designation ‘a mong’ was used for years as a 
synonymous of the amount 6 billion NOK.   
 
There are obvious uncertainties related to the costs of this large project. Statoil is familiar 
with the technology, and is therefore better informed than the government. This leads to 
asymmetry of information related to exogenous variables affecting the costs, like Statoil’s 
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technological possibilities or the difficulty in implementing certain productive tasks. The 
effort made by Statoil to minimize the costs can not be easily monitored by the government, 
and is an example of information asymmetry related to an endogenous variable. Because the 
government represents the public interest it has a special obligation to ensure that any 
agreement it enters into is in line with the public interest. It is in the public interest that all 
parties entering into a contracted agreement with the government have incentives to keep 
costs at a minimum. Statoil is concerned about their profits, and will not minimize the costs 
of the project or reveal their technological possibilities if that is not what maximize their 
profits.  
 
Given that the government has decided to invest in this project – how should they proceed? 
How might this information asymmetry problem affect such a contract? And are these 
problems taken into account in the already existing contract? The forth chapter introduces 
the theory of incentives. I use this to again discuss why CCS, especially in a CO2 value 
chain, is difficult to implement without governmental support. Finally, I discuss the 
characteristics the contract should have according to the theory of incentives, and further 
whether the actual contract embodies these characteristics. I will show that when such 
asymmetry exists, the government is forced to give up costly rents to Statoil, and to mitigate 
these costs, allocations are distorted away from first-best allocations. Finally, I will show 
that the actual contract is not optimal, even though it gives Statoil some incentives to 
minimize the costs.  
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2.  Background 
Here, I will first give some background information on climate change, Norway’s 
commitment and the economical policy instruments in use. Then I introduce the Mongstad 
project, and explain what carbon capture and storage (CCS) is and why this will be 
implemented at Mongstad.  
2.1 The economics and politics of climate change 
The last year has been remarkable when it comes to climate policy. First, the International 
Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) published the Fourth Assessment Report1 confirming that 
the climate change is man-made, that the effects might be catastrophic on eco-systems, 
societies and economies, and that drastic reductions in emissions must take place to avoid 
the worst effects. Emissions of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide (CO2)2, contribute 
to global warming. Second, the Stern review3 claimed that the mitigation costs that seem 
large today, are moderate compared to the costs of a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy.  
 
Climate change is possibly the best, or most serious, example of one type of market failure: 
externalities. Individuals or firms do not suffer the full burden of producing CO2, but the 
society does. Private costs can be equated to the social cost by implementing a cost of 
emitting CO2 – either by quotas and a market for carbon, or by imposing a carbon tax. 
However, this is quite problematic. Climate change is a global problem – affecting all 
countries to some extent, and affected by all countries: it does not matter where the CO2 is 
emitted, it will still have the same damaging impact. Ideally, all countries should cooperate 
and impose the same costs on pollution to avoid the problem of free-riding: a country would 
still benefit from the other countries emission reductions even if it is not participating and 
cutting its own emissions. Such cooperation turns out to be very difficult. Today, economic 
growth is closely connected to increased emissions because of increased demand for energy.   
                                                 
1 IPCC (2007). 
2 There are several gases contributing to global warming. CO2 represents the largest contribution because of the 
large quantities emitted.  
3 Stern (2006). 
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 One step towards creating a global carbon price has been made. The Kyoto Protocol entered 
into force in 2005, signed by 166 countries. The developed countries have agreed to reduce 
their overall emissions of six greenhouse gases, included CO2, by at least 5 % below 1990 
levels over the first commitment period from 2008-2012. This way, a cap on emission has 
emerged. Countries are free to choose, within their national limits, how best to deliver 
emission reductions nationally. Flexible mechanisms are created that enable these countries 
to meet their commitments efficiently. International Emissions Trading (IET) allows trading 
of national quotas between countries. Within this framework, the European Union (EU) has 
developed its own Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). The first trading period from 2005-
2007 was considered a trial period. The price has varied a lot – from nearly 0 to 30 €/ton 
CO2. The second period is from 2008-2012. Emission reducing projects in other countries 
can also be used for countries to meet their Kyoto commitments. Joint Implementation (JI) is 
hosted by other developed countries, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) by 
other developing countries. 
 
In 2005, Norway developed its own trading scheme that included the industries which 
already paid taxes on their emissions. Already in 1991 Norway had introduced a CO2 tax of 
approximately 300kr/tCO2. From 2008-2012, the Norwegian system will be expanded, 
including some sectors that used to pay the CO2 tax, and will become an integrated part of 
the EU ETS. 
 
In theory, imposing a CO2 tax or tradable quotas will have the same effect: emission 
reduction will be done in a cost effective way by equating the price of emissions among 
polluters. Now that an international quota market is established, there will be no need for a 
CO2 tax, given that this system is efficient. There is also discussion on how the quotas should 
be distributed, whether they should be given away for free, sold or auctioned. In theory, 
these are equally good instruments if the number of quotas to be given away is fixed. Firms 
will have a direct cost from purchasing quotas in the marked if they are emitting more than 
the quotas they possess. Alternatively, they could sell quotas instead of emitting: this makes 
polluting equivalent to lost income from not being able to sell. The market will make the 
firms buy or sell quotas until the marginal cost of polluting is equalized among polluters, 
making the emission reductions cost effective. A potential problem with free quotas is new 
firms, and firms expanding their production. If they are given free quotas, the cost of 
polluting will not be properly taken into account in their investment decision.  
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2.2 The Mongstad project 
In 2005 Statoil applied for a license to build a combined heat and power (CHP) plant without 
carbon capture at Mongstad. This type of plant is very efficient since it also exploits some of 
the heat needed to burn the natural gas when generating electricity. The planned installed 
capacity is 280 MW of electricity and 350 MW of thermal energy (heat). The already 
existing refinery at Mongstad would be supplied with heat and some of the electricity. 
Surplus electricity would be in part sold to the Troll A petroleum field, and part of it would 
be available for other uses. The estimated net increase of CO2 emissions is 900,000 tons, and 
total emissions at Mongstad to be 2.7 million tons. 
2.2.1 Carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
However, producing electricity from gas-fired power plants can be done in a cleaner way. It 
is possible to capture the CO2 by separating it from the gas. Then, after compressing it, the 
CO2 can be transported to a suitable storage location, and injected. This way, the CO2 will 
not be emitted into the atmosphere and therefore not contribute to global warming. 
 
This can also be applied to coal-fired power plants and industry. The CO2 content of the flue 
gas from gas-fired power plants is lower than that of coal, which makes it more expensive 
per unit to capture CO2 from a gas-fired power plant. 
 
There are several ways to capture CO2, and these can be divided into three categories4. The 
most known and well-developed technology is post-combustion. The CO2 is separated from 
part of the flue gases produced by the combustion of the natural gas. These systems normally 
use a liquid solvent to capture the CO2 present in the flue gas stream. 
 
Pre-combustion, as the name indicates, is a method that converts the gas into CO2 and 
hydrogen before it is used to generate electricity. Hydrogen is a carbon-free energy carrier 
that can be combusted to generate power and/or heat. Although the initial steps of this 
method are more elaborate and costly, the higher concentrations of CO2 in the gas stream and 
the higher pressure make the separation easier. 
 
                                                 
4 IPCC (2006). 
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The last method, oxyfuel combustion, adds oxygen when burning the gas. This results in high 
CO2 concentrations in the gas stream and, hence, in easier separation of CO2 and in increased 
energy requirements in the separation of oxygen from air. These systems are being studied in 
gas turbine systems, but conceptual designs for such applications are still in the research 
phase. 
 
Transportation of CO2 can be done either by ships or pipelines, the latter preferred for 
transporting large amounts for distances up to around 1,000 km. This operates as a mature 
market technology, whereas shipping of CO2 has only been carried out on a small scale. 
 
The uncertainty related to CCS, apart from the uncertainties regarding the costs, is related to 
storage. There is limited knowledge about the different methods when it comes to leakage 
and environmental impact. Storage of CO2 in deep, onshore or offshore geological 
formations uses many of the same technologies that have been developed by the oil and gas 
industry and has been proven to be economically feasible under specific conditions for oil 
and gas fields and saline formations, but not yet for storage in unminable coal beds. Ocean 
storage is another option. This could be done in two ways: by injecting and dissolving CO2 
into the water column (typically below 1,000 meters), or by depositing it onto the sea floor at 
depths below 3,000 meters where CO2 is denser than water and is expected to form a ‘lake’ 
that would delay dissolution of CO2 into the surrounding environment. This is still in the 
research stage. Further, it is possible to react CO2 with metal oxides and produce stable 
carbonates, but this is energy intensive and still in the research stage. CO2 for industrial uses 
is another opportunity, but this potential is small. 
 
CO2 used for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) could lead to additional revenues from oil 
recovery. By injecting CO2 into the reservoirs, more oil could be extracted. This could also 
be applied to gas- and coal production. This could be done in addition to CO2 storage. 
 
At Mongstad, post-combustion is the method of interest. This is a well known technology to 
Statoil. They have since 1996 separated about 1 million tonnes of CO2 annually from the 
well stream from the Sleipner West field at the North Sea continental shelf by using amine 
absorption technology. The CO2 has been injected into the Utsira deep saline aquifer 
formation to save the Norwegian tax on CO2 emissions. Evidence from this project is that 
there is no leakage from the storage. 
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2.2.2 Political difficulties5 
Gas-fired power plants have been a difficult topic for Norwegian politicians throughout the 
last decades. In 2000, this was the reason for the government resigning. The need for energy 
and electricity for households and industries on one hand, and environmental concerns on the 
other, makes it difficult. Cleaning gas-fired power plants by implementing CCS has been 
largely discussed the last years. Some politicians and environmentalists are still against it. 
They argue that resources should be allocated towards renewable resources, since CCS is 
only a temporary solution. Among some parties, both politicians, industries and 
environmentalists, however, clean gas plants has been a preferred solution, although they do 
not agree on who should bear the costs and risk.  
 
International commitment makes it difficult to allow new large sources of CO2 emissions. 
The Stoltenberg government declared in October 2005 that all licenses given to new gas 
plants should be based on CCS. Despite this, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate (NVE) approved Statoil’s application in the summer of 2006 without any 
cleaning requirements. This led to hard negotiations during the fall 2006. There were several 
possible outcomes. 
 
The government could have let Statoil proceed with the project without CCS. This would 
have been in Statoil’s interest, but this could not have been accepted by all the political 
parties in the government, and would therefore have led to a governmental crisis, and 
probably to the end of the governmental coalition.   
 
The government might have been able to force Statoil to implement CCS. Statoil, however, 
had been signaling that this would be too expensive and lead to a cancellation of the entire 
project. This would not have been an acceptable outcome for the government either. 
 
The government could help financing the capture facility, as they ended up doing. This 
pleased environmentalists and liberal politicians, but not economists and others who are 
skeptical to the use of public resources in a non-optimal way6.  Moreover, it could be 
                                                 
5 Tjernshaugen (2007). 
6 Strict economical calculations show that as a mitigation option, investing in Mongstad is by far one of the 
most expensive ones. See further discussion in chapter 3. 
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difficult because of competition regulations7. However, this was the only feasible outcome 
for the government.  
2.2.3 The contract8 
In 2006, the Norwegian government undertook an agreement with Statoil to establish the 
world's largest full-scale CCS project in conjunction with the projected combined heat and 
power plant at Mongstad.  
 
The power plant will start producing in 2010. Implementing CCS will be done in two steps: 
 
Step 1: Development of technology. The two parties will establish a technology company/-
partnership that will build a first capture facility with capacity to capture at least 100,000 ton 
CO2 per year. The purpose is to identify, develop, test and qualify possible technological 
solutions, and hereby reduce the costs and risks related to building and operating full-scale 
capture facilities. Statoil is committed to own 20% of the technology company, whereas the 
government will own the remaining 80%. Other companies are invited to enter the project by 
taking over parts of the governments shares.    
 
Step 2: Full-scale carbon capture of CO2. From 2014, the combined heat and power plant at 
Mongstad will be operated with carbon capture. The planning of this will be done in parallel 
with step 1. The details regarding the investment decisions, including choice of technology 
and estimated costs, will be ready by 2012. At this time, the building of the capture facility at 
the power plant will get started. The parties have agreed upon choosing an accomplishment 
strategy that minimizes risk, and that building the future capture facility should not 
deteriorate the refinery’s international competitiveness.  
The Norwegian government will cover the investment- and operation costs of the Step 2 
capture facility and also the costs of transport and storage. Any positive value of the CO2 in a 
possible CO2 value chain are going to be withdrawn the costs of the government.  
Statoil are going to cover the costs equivalent of their alternative CO2 cost if they had not 
implemented CCS (CO2 costs corresponding to other Norwegian industry in competition 
                                                 
7 The EU Commission is working on changing the rules regarding economic competition to make an exception 
for governmental support for CCS. See Bellona (2007): 
http://www.bellona.org/articles/EU_Commission_for_CCS
8 Ministry of Oil and Energy (2006): ”Samarbeid om håndtering av CO2 på Mongstad – 
gjennomføringsavtalen” 
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with foreign industry). They are also obliged to cover 100% of any costs exceeding the 
estimated investment costs.  
Nonetheless, increased costs due to exogenous factors, such as increased gas prices, will be 
covered by the government.  
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3. Costs 
The aim of this chapter is first to give an understanding of the potential costs of CCS as a 
mitigation strategy in general. I show how the profitability of CCS on both coal- and gas-
fired power plants depends on how strict current and future climate policies are. These are 
simple calculations based on one set of cost estimates. The second part discusses different 
cost estimates available for new gas-fired power plants only; this to give a picture on what in 
theory can be the expected cost for the Mongstad project. The last part compares these costs 
to Statoil’s projected costs, and discusses why they differ. When the government enters into 
an agreement with Statoil, this is the information about the potential costs of the project that 
is known to both parties.  
3.1 The effect of a carbon price on marginal costs 
This is a bottom-up analysis of the costs of producing electricity from fossil fuels, where one 
coal-fired and one gas-fired technology are considered. I look at how a price on carbon may 
affect the competitiveness of coal and gas, on existing and new plants, and with and without 
carbon capture and storage.  
3.1.1 The marginal costs of producing electricity 
The supply of electricity depends on each plant’s marginal cost of producing one unit more. 
An existing plant is willing to produce if their short run marginal costs, or their variable 
costs, are lower than the price they will get on the market. This is an ex post marginal cost: 
the cost of building the plant is considered a sunk cost, and do not enter the decision on 
whether to produce or not. The variable costs consist of two main categories: fuel costs and 
variable operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. These can be considered as labour and 
other inputs that vary with the production. 
 
For renewables such as wind and solar, the only variable cost is the variable operation and 
maintenance costs, which are low. For fossil fuels, the fuel cost will be the largest 
component.  
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However, before a plant is built, the investment cost has to be taken into account. In bottom-
up models, this is done by assuming a discount rate and an economic lifetime of the plant, as 
well as how much the plant will produce during a year, and this way find a cost of capital per 
kWh. In addition, there are fixed O&M costs which depend only on the plant size, and not on 
production.  
 
This way, we get an ex ante marginal cost of producing electricity that will consist of three 
main components: capital costs, fuel costs and O&M costs9. These will be taken into account 
when deciding whether to build a new plant or not, and what kind of plant to build.  
Burning fossil fuels leads to great emissions of the climate gas carbon dioxide, CO2. Coal 
emits more CO2 per unit of energy, 25.8tC/TJ, compared to natural gas, which emits 
15.3tC/TJ10. Emissions per kWh will also depend on how efficient the plant uses the fuel. 
Coal-fired plants have a thermal efficiency of 35-50%, which is less than the 45-60% of gas-
fired plants. These two factors both contribute to coal-fired plants being more polluting than 
gas-fired ones.  
 
A price on CO2 emissions will enter the marginal cost of producing electricity. Both the ex 
post and ex ante costs will get an additional component, the CO2 cost.  
3.1.2  Carbon capture and storage (CCS) - the effect on marginal costs 
CCS can be applied to both existing and new fossil fuel plants. It will cost more in terms of 
kWh to retrofit an existing plant than to integrate it when building a new plant. Because coal 
contains more carbon than natural gas, capturing carbon from a coal plant is cheaper than 
from a gas plant per unit. In addition to this capture cost, there will be a transportation cost 
and a storage cost. The transportation cost is highly depending on the location of the plant 
and already existing infrastructure. Implementing carbon capture will reduce the CO2 
emissions with approximately 80%, and will therefore considerable reduce the CO2 cost. 
 
In Norway, several individual projects, included Mongstad, have concluded that CO2 for 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR) is not profitable11. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate also 
concluded in a study that CCS for EOR is not yet profitable. Bellona, on the other hand, 
                                                 
9 Both fixed and variable O&M costs. 
10 Reinaud (2003). 
11 See for example  http://www.adressa.no/nyheter/okonomi/article887582.ece
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claims that this is profitable if several projects are coordinated and proper infrastructure is 
developed, see Bellona (2005). I choose not to include possible revenues from EOR here in 
my analysis. 
 
The costs of implementing CCS at Mongstad can most likely be compared to retrofitting 
existing gas-fired power plants. 
Studies12 estimate that examples of the total additional cost per kWh can be  
- 3,60 €cents/kWh for existing coal-fired plants (EC) 
- 1,39 €cents/kWh for new coal-fired plants (NC) 
- 4,05 €cents/kWh13 for existing gas-fired plants (EG) 
- 1,54 €cents/kWh for new gas-fired plants (NG) 
 
The reduction in the CO2 cost, which will determine if it is profitable or not to implement 
CCS, will be highly dependent on the CO2 price. 
3.1.3  The merit order at various CO2 prices 
The merit order of the market is a ranking of generators, from those with the lowest average 
variable costs to those with the highest. If all existing technologies on the market were 
included, adjusted by their market share, this would represent the supply curve of electricity. 
Here, I have just included the fossil-fuel technologies that I have studied, both existing and 
new, to illustrate the differences in marginal costs. The results are presented in figure 3.1. I 
consider four possible carbon prices: 
0, 20, 50 and 100 €/t CO214. Colours 
are used to illustrate the degrees of 
emissions, with the darkest one 
marking the largest emissions, coming 
from existing coal plants. The power 
plants with CCS are white. 
Abbreviations are explained in the 
bow below. 
Abbreviations used for the different technologies 
in figure 3.1  
 
EC   Existing coal-fired plant 
EG    Existing gas-fired plant 
NC   New coal-fired plant 
NG   New gas-fired plant 
EC CCS  Existing coal-fired plant with CCS  
EG CCS  Existing gas-fired plant with CCS 
NC CCS  New coal-fired plant with CCS 
NG CCS   New gas-fired with CCS 
 
                                                 
12 IPCC (2005). See appendix for explanation. 
13 Own assumption: see explanation given in ‘Appendix 1: Assumptions and calculations’ 
14 Both the Stern (2007) and IPCC (2006) give explanations on what carbon price is needed to reach various 
stabilization levels of CO2, and these prices are consistent with theirs.  
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Figure 3.1: Change in the merit order at different CO2 prices. 
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Explanations of the results in figure 3.1: 
 
No CO2 price – baseline case: Typically, an already built coal plant will be operated at base 
load15 as its marginal costs are low compared to those of a gas plant, and it takes less time to 
restart. The price of natural gas has been higher than that of coal16, and since the largest cost 
component is fuel, the coal plant is cheaper. Building a new coal plant is more expensive 
than a new gas plant, and a new gas plant is more efficient than a new coal plant. With no 
CO2-price, a plant with CCS will not have the advantage of a lower CO2 cost. The only 
difference in their marginal costs is the additional cost of CCS. This makes all CCS plants 
more expensive than regular plants. We also see that new CCS plants are cheaper than the 
retrofitted existing plants.  
 
CO2-price = 20€/tCO2:  The price of a new coal plant has increased from 3.5 to 5.2, and has 
become more expensive than a new gas plant, which has a marginal cost of 4.68. This is the 
only change in the merit order at this price. Retrofitting existing plants are still the most 
expensive, since the saved CO2 costs are still relatively low. 
 
CO2-price = 50€/tCO2: At this carbon price, things start to happen. The marginal costs are 
more evened out, ranging between 5.5 and 8, and the plants with CCS are getting 
competitive. The retrofitted gas-fired plant still has the highest marginal costs, but is closely 
followed by new and existing coal plants without CCS: at this price, coal plants with CCS 
will be cheaper than those without. 
 
CO2-price = 100€/tCO2:  At this price, both existing and new coal without CCS are clearly 
worse off than the others. The winners are new plants with CCS, followed by gas-fired 
plants, both new and existing. Here, it is also cheaper to build a new gas-fired power plant 
with CCS than without. Note that even at this price it is not profitable to retrofit an existing 
gas-fired plant. The marginal cost of existing coal, which is the cheapest in the baseline case, 
is now 500% higher. Existing coal, with a marginal cost of 11.90 €cents, is 4.47 €cents more 
expensive than a retrofitted coal plant. This also happens for new coal plants, with a 
                                                 
15 A base load power plant is one that provides a steady flow of power regardless of total power demand. 
(Wikipedia) 
16 IEA, 2006. 
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marginal cost of 12.01 €cents/kWh that is 5.42 €cents/kWh higher than for a new coal-fired 
plant built with CCS. 
 
Figure 3.2: CO2 price: the influence on the marginal costs. 
 
At what carbon price will it be profitable to implement CCS? Figure 3.2. illustrates that CCS 
plants are less affected by an increased CO2 price, and will be able to compete with regular 
plants if the carbon price gets high enough. For both of the coal-fired plants, this happens at 
somewhere between 20 and 50 €/tCO2. For a new gas plants, this happens at a price between 
50 and 100 €/tCO2. For existing gas plants, however, this does not even happen at a carbon 
price of 100 €/tCO2. The costs of implementing CCS at the power plant at Mongstad are 
probably most comparable to the costs of an existing gas-fired power plant, as the power 
plant was projected without CCS. This will be discussed further in chapter 3.2.2. From this 
analysis, we see that implementing CCS at Mongstad will only be profitable if the quota 
price increases substantially.  
3.1.4  Discussion 
These results are quite interesting, but such a simple analysis has some important limitations 
for predicting future production costs.  
 
There is a lot of uncertainty when it comes to CCS. It is a new and unproved technology, at 
least when it comes to larger full-scale projects. This might lead firms to need significant 
differences in expected costs to be willing to choose CCS.  
 
The fuel prices are assumed to be constant. This will be an endogenous variable depending 
on how much electricity that will come from gas fired plants in the future. Natural gas is also 
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an exhaustible resource. For a given stock, the price will increase as the resource becomes 
scarcer. Predictions17 indicate that the price of both coal and natural gas will increase in the 
future.  
 
The access to coal and natural gas will also affect the investment decisions. Natural gas is 
costly to transport, and is often dependent on infrastructure. Building power plants close to 
the natural gas source could solve this problem. The supply security is also important. 
Relying on imports from other countries, like Russia, is a situation many countries would 
like to avoid.  
 
Another thing worth mentioning is renewables. There are other ways to reduce emissions 
from electricity generation besides CCS, and it is likely that some of these will be 
competitive at approximately the same CO2 price as CCS. However, the costs of the various 
renewables are highly site dependent, and will vary from country to country. Technological 
progress and cost reductions are dependent on amount invested in each technology, and it is 
common belief that it will take time before renewables can fully compete with fossil fuels. It 
will also take huge investments in renewables to be able to replace it – the size of a fossil 
fuel plant is typically 500-1000 MW, compared to 1-150 MW for renewables. This is why 
CCS is considered to play an important role in emission reductions.  
3.2  Carbon Capture and Storage Cost Estimates 
There are several ways to express the increased costs of CCS. The two most important 
changes will be the increased investment costs from building the capture facility, and the 
decrease in efficiency, which leads to increased fuel costs.  
 
One way is to look at the increased marginal costs of electricity production, as I did in the 
previous chapter. These will depend on assumptions, the most crucial one being the price of 
natural gas. This price has increased the last years, and this might change the forecasts. The 
gas price is difficult to forecast since it depends on many variables, both technical (the total 
gas reserves, the extracted amount), economical (demand, market concentration and market 
power) and political (uncertainty regarding supply). 
  
                                                 
17 IEA (2005). 
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the difference between CO2 captured and CO2 avoided.  
 
Another option is to consider the mitigation costs. Based on the same assumptions, it is 
possible to find a price of CO2 avoided – this means dividing the costs on the amount of CO2 
you get rid of by implementing CCS. This can be compared to the CO2 price directly; if it is 
lower than this, there will be an expected gain from implementing CCS. If not, it will be 
cheaper to emit all of the CO2 from the plant, and pay the CO2 price. Figure 3.3 shows the 
difference between CO2 captured and CO2 avoided: as the efficiency is decreased when 
implementing carbon capture, more fuel is used, and more CO2 produced, therefore the 
amount of CO2 captured is larger. 
 
Alternatively, one can consider the investment costs and annual operation costs of CCS. The 
investment costs will not depend on assumptions about gas prices, but the annual operation 
costs will.  
3.2.1  Cost estimates for CCS on gas-fired in general 
IPCC’s Special Report on Carbon dioxide Capture and Storage offers seven recent case 
studies18. The investment costs are 700-970 EUR/kW, and this is 64-100% more than the 
reference plants. The increases of marginal costs range from 37-85 % over reference plant. 
The cost of CO2 avoided ranges from 29-70 EUR/tCO2. This includes transportation costs 
of 0-3.8 EUR/tCO2 and geological storage costs of 0.5-6.4 EUR/tCO2. The results are based 
on natural gas prices of 2.2-3.4 EUR /GJ.  
                                                 
18 Currency conversion: 1 EUR = 1,3 USD 
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The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Prospects for CO2 Capture and Storage offers 
several examples of technologies – one with chemical absorption. The increased marginal 
costs are 40.8 %, and the cost of CO2 avoided is 27.5. This is without transportation and 
storage. Assumed gas price is 2.3 EUR /GJ. The estimated transportation costs are 1.5-15.4 
EUR/tCO2 (depends on scale and distance). 1.5-38.5 EUR /tCO2 injection costs (low end 
refers to aquifers – say 1.5-3.9). This gives a possible range of 26.9-46.2 EUR/tCO2 in total.  
 
The World Energy Council’s (WEC) study from 2000, World Energy Assessment: Energy 
and the Challenge of Sustainability, also provides cost estimates for CCS. Investment costs 
are 698 and 706 EUR/kW; this is an increase of 100 and 120 %. The marginal costs increase 
with 54 and 62 %. The costs of CO2 avoided are 45 EUR/tCO2 and 49 EUR/tCO2. Gas 
price assumption is 2.36 EUR /GJ. 
 
Other studies19 are Anderson and Newell (2003): 40 - 59 EUR/tCO2 and Hendriks et al. 
(2000): 42 - 85 EUR/tCO2.  
3.2.2 How costly is the Mongstad project assumed to be? 
‘Bakgrunn for vedtak’, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate’s (NVE) 
report that justifies their decision to say yes to an allowance for Statoil’s combined heat and 
power plant, reproduces Statoil’s cost estimates. The costs of CCS are assumed to be 450-
660 NOK/tCO2 (or equivalently 56-83 EUR20/tCO2). The investment costs are 6 billion 
NOK, and the annual operation costs are assumed to be in the range of 340-550 million 
NOK/year.  
 
In the Ministry of Oil and Energy’s (MOE) presentation of the Mongstad project, Statoil’s 
estimates are also given. Statoil claims that the capture facility could cost approximately 3-4 
billion NOK. In addition, there will be costs of transportation and storage, adding another 1-
2 billion NOK. This gives a mitigation cost of at least 500 NOK/tCO2 (63 EUR/tCO2). 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) has published a report on the possibilities of 
using CO2 for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) on the Norwegian continental shelf where they 
give an estimate on the costs of CCS on a gas-fired plant in Norway. They are costs assumed 
                                                 
19 As used in Torvanger (2005). 
20 Currency conversion 1 EUR = 8 NOK. 
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for Mongstad or Kårstø. Here the investment costs are 7.5 billion NOK, and the annual 
operation costs are assumed to be 5.2 billion NOK (over ten years, giving 520 million 
NOK/year). This gives costs of 383 – 448 NOK/t CO2 (48 - 56 EUR/tCO2).  
 
This report has been criticized by Bellona (2005): ‘The NPD report bases its conclusions on 
numbers from 2000 and 2002, which are twice as expensive as the Carbon Capture Project 
(CCP) and Aker/Kværner assessments.’ They further state that ‘Before Christmas 2004, 
Aker/Kværner/GassTek published a study indicating that the cost for a capture facility that 
could be readily built by 2007 would be below NOK 200 (EUR 25) per tonne CO2.’ 
3.2.3  The projected costs of the Mongstad project compared to other studies 
 
Figure 3.4: An illustration of Statoil’s projected costs of the Mongstad project compared to other studies. 
 
As illustrated in figure 3.4, the cost estimates of Statoil are high compared to other studies. 
At first sight, it might seem like Statoil is exaggerating the costs to avoid that the 
government forces them to implement CCS with no financial support. However, a possible 
explanation is that the plant was initially projected as a plant without CCS. This makes the 
costs similar to retrofitting an existing plant. Choosing other types of equipment, like 
turbines, and another design in general would have made it less costly to implement CCS. 
NVE decided not to make Statoil re-project the plant, as this would take several years and 
cost several million NOK21. Another factor that might explain the differences is the gas price 
assumptions – Statoil might have used a higher price in their calculations. 
 
 
                                                 
21 NVE (2005). 
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4. Theory of incentives 
First, I will use the theory of incentives to explain why the firms themselves might fail to 
bring carbon capture and storage to the market. Then I introduce two types of information 
asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse selection, and explain why this is relevant to the 
Mongstad project. The existence of such asymmetry will affect the optimal contract, and I 
use a model to show this. Finally, I compare this to the actual contract.   
4.1 Some possible explanations on why the market might fail to 
develop CCS  
A large project like carbon capture and storage will require new infrastructure and large 
investments. In addition, as shown in chapter 3, the costs are still high and the profitability of 
CCS is uncertain. At least if the CO2 is to be used for enhanced oil recovery (EOR), power 
plants and oil fields must coordinate their decisions, and this might lead to problems. First, I 
will introduce the hold-up problem, and discuss how it might be relevant to CCS. Then I will 
discuss why the steep learning curve and economics of scale characterizing CCS might make 
firms reluctant to be the first to invest, and that this leads to a too slow, or non existing 
development of such projects. 
4.1.1 The hold-up problem 
When two firms are about to get involved in a possible project, they might have to make 
project specific investments. If they can commit to a binding contract up-front, the trade can 
be carried out efficiently. However, if it is not possible, for various reasons, to make such a 
contract, potential problems arise. 
 
Consider the case where in period 0, the two firms make a contract. One of the firms makes a 
relationship specific investment in period 1. In period 2, when trade is to take place, the 
other firm will have a stronger position – if the contract is not binding, it can extract all or 
most of the gains from trade. Being foresighted, the first firm will be less willing to make the 
investment, or not willing at all, and the project will not be realised. This is known as the 
hold-up problem – the mutual dependence keeps profitable projects from being realised. 
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4.1.2  A CO2 value chain as a potential hold-up problem22 
Carbon capture and storage is a mitigation strategy that stops CO2 from being emitted into 
the atmosphere. But in addition to having a value when being stored that corresponds to the 
carbon price, there might be a market for the gas itself. Oil producers can inject CO2 in their 
oil fields, leading to more oil being extracted from each field. This is known as enhanced oil 
recovery (EOR). CO2 has the quality of making the oil thinner, and thus easier to extract. 
This will naturally provide extra revenue for the oil producers, and accordingly, they will 
have a willingness to pay for this CO2. Today, natural gas is used for the same purpose. This 
has an opportunity cost since the natural gas otherwise could have been sold at the market.  
 
However, to be able to use CO2 instead of natural gas or water, some irreversible 
investments must be undertaken to prepare the oil fields to start this last production phase. 
To be willing to make these investments, the oil producers must be sure that they will get 
CO2 delivered – if not, their investments will not give them any revenue. The suppliers of 
CO2 could exploit this, demanding a higher price, since the use of CO2 is the only way to 
produce more oil from the field after the investments are made. Foreseeing this, the oil fields 
might not want to make these investments. 
 
Each field will only need the gas at a certain period of its lifetime. This period is not always 
easy to foresee, which makes the demand for CO2 very uncertain. To mend this problem, 
CO2 could be temporary stored, and delivered when it is needed. In addition, this short 
period of demand makes the CO2 suppliers need several oil fields as buyers, which requires 
several oil fields to undertake these irreversible investments. Several buyers also imply that 
the price will be more uncertain, as it depends on aggregate demand.  Another investment 
needed, is pipelines for transportation. This will require large initial investments, but small 
variable costs. The alternative, transportation by ships, do not require large investments, but 
the variable costs are large.    
 
For CO2 to be used for EOR, large amounts of it are needed. Because of this, pipelines seem 
to be the best alternative. Another consequence of this is that several suppliers of CO2 are 
needed. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) showed that there was a willingness to 
pay for CO2, but only in large amounts – larger than what Mongstad alone could provide. 
                                                 
22 Hustad, C.-W. et al. (2004) 
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This complicates the issue further – coordination between firms in such an uncertain project 
will probably prove difficult. Firms of different sizes and locations might have to cooperate 
on infrastructure to be able to get the CO2 both to and from the temporary storage location.  
 
If a power plant has already implemented CCS, the oil fields might be able to get the CO2 at 
a low price, since they represent the only market for CO2. Any positive net price will be 
better for the power plant, since the alternative ‘price’ they get from storing it is zero. As the 
power plants know this up front, they would not have incentives to invest in CCS if the 
profitability of the project was highly depending on expected revenue from selling the CO2 
to oil fields. The problems with making a binding contract on beforehand could come from 
the oil fields not being able to commit to buying. Exogenous factors like the oil price, that is 
difficult to predict, will influence the decision on whether to continue producing or not, and 
hence, whether to demand CO2 or not. 
4.1.3 Learning curve and economies of scale 
Historical experience shows that costs tend to decline with investment and operating 
experience. When data on marginal costs are plotted against cumulative installation, a 
downward sloping trend often appears. A curve can be drawn to fit this trend, and this is 
called a learning curve. With technologies and projects with steep learning curves, firms 
would rather see other firms undertake the first, costly investments. If there is diffusion of 
know-how, the fruits of this investment will not only come in the hands of the investing 
firm, but on the others’ as well. This way, firms will choose a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy. 
 
Figure 4.1: Illustrative learning curve for a new technology 
This is relevant to both the 
Mongstad project itself and the 
potential CO2 value chain. The 
learning curve for capture 
facilities is assumed to be steep, 
as well as the experience made 
from a large scale storage and 
EOR. 
 
When it comes to a project, 
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firms might want to come in at a later stage, after the first firms have invested. They will be 
able to do this, as the investments are already made, and due to economies of scale, the 
variable costs might come down as more firms join. This is known problems before the 
projects are started, and again, this can lead to projects being abandoned. 
 
For the CO2 value chain, this could be a problem. This is a very risky project, and as I 
explained above, it is crucial for the profitability that several firms join. Adding more buyers 
and sellers will make the infrastructure less costly, in terms of traded units.  
 
4.1.4  Possible solutions 
It is quite clear that there is a potential role for the government as a coordinator. But even 
though this could reduce the problems discussed above, the government should consider the 
enormous uncertainties in this large project. As discussed in the previous chapters, CCS 
might play an important role in reducing the climate problem, but it is not evident that 
Norway should undertake such large investments. 
 
It is also argued that if a project is profitable enough, the market will find a way to cooperate 
and form binding contracts themselves. As for the CO2 value chain in Norway, it might be 
profitable23, but it will depend on many independent actors and variables like the oil price, 
that is very difficult to forecast. Most costs of the project will come in a few years, whereas 
the revenues will come much later on.  
 
Joint ownership is another solution. This is partly realised when it comes to this particular 
case, as for example Statoil is the owner of both power plants selling and oil fields buying 
CO2. But still, several actors are needed in this value chain. 
 
The governmental intervention at Mongstad will help Statoil to bear the burden of being the 
first firm to invest in full scale carbon capture. Important experience might reduce the 
uncertainties of such projects, and make the next projects less costly. 
                                                 
23 Bellona (2005) has the most optimistic calculations, claiming that CCS for EOR will give substantial 
revenues, given that the government undertakes heavy investments. 
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4.2 Contract theory 
In the last chapter, a contract seemed to solve the problem with implementing carbon capture 
and storage. Here, I will first discuss theoretical problems that might appear with such a 
contract. Then I will discuss how this applies to this case in particular, recalling the 
discussion from last chapter. Finally, I will look at the existing contract, and if these 
problems seems to have been taken into account.  
4.2.1  Adverse selection and moral hazard 
A regulator, like the Norwegian government, wants a firm like Statoil to realize a project. All 
economic agents, be it the government or a firm like Statoil, have a utility function or profit 
function that they want to maximize. Most often the firm has a proper utility function to 
maximize that does not coincide with the one of the regulator. Therefore, an enforceable 
contract that controls that the choices made in the production would be in the regulator’s 
interest must be made. The problem arises when the firm has private information – it knows 
more than the regulator about the costs of the project. This information can be of two types. 
The firm might have private knowledge about its costs or valuation that is ignored by the 
regulator; this is known as adverse selection. The exact opportunity cost of this task or the 
precise technology used are examples of such private knowledge. In general, this allows the 
firm to extract a rent from its interaction with the regulator even if its bargaining power is 
poor. The other version involves an action that the firm might take, or not take, that is 
unobserved by the regulator; this is known as moral hazard. These actions might affect the 
value of trade or the firm’s performance. A leading example is effort, which positively 
influences the firm’s production costs but also create a disutility for the firm. To be able to 
get the firm to make the wanted level effort, the transfer to the agent should be depending on 
the result, leading the firm to make the effort to maximize his own gain from the interaction. 
4.2.2 The Mongstad case – an optimal contract 
Here, I will use a simple model24 where a regulator wants to realize a single, fixed-size 
project, that has the value S for consumers, and a single firm has the adequate technology. I 
will assume that getting Statoil to implement CCS is the government’s objective. In addition, 
they would like this to be done in the least costly way, both by giving Statoil incentives to 
                                                 
24 Laffont, J.J. and Tirole, J. (1993). The model is taken from Chapter 1 ‘Cost-Reimburdement Rules’, p. 55 -
62. 
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make an effort to minimize the costs, and by extracting Statoil’s potential rents from the 
project.  
4.2.2.1. General assumptions  
Assumption 1: The regulator is subject to adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Statoil has private information about its technology at the date of contracting, and its cost-
reducing effort is unobservable by the government. 
 C = C(β,e,…) + ε 
where β is a technological parameter; a high β indicates an inefficient technology, hence C’β, 
and e is the effort. Effort is assumed to reduce costs at a decreasing rate: Ce’ and Ce’’. The 
noise term, ε, stands for either forecast errors or accounting inaccuracies. Cβ’. This analysis 
assumes that Statoil has a technology that will be used in the project. In reality, Statoil and 
the government are to agree on an appropriate technology after the contract is signed, and 
before the building of the capture facility starts. Statoil can use a technology they are 
familiar with from their other carbon capture projects, or get another firm to deliver the 
capture facility. However, the difficulty and costs of implementing any CCS technology on 
the power plant at Mongstad will be a parameter known to Statoil, but not to the 
government. Information on projected costs of the different technologies, as I provided in 
chapter 3.2.1., is known to the government. Hence, this assumption can be applied to the 
Mongstad case. In addition, chapter 3.2.1. showed that the costs of implementing CCS are 
very uncertain. This does not represent a problem as β can be thought of as representing an 
interval of costs, or that the cost function includes another uncertain variable, here 
represented by ε. This uncertainty is the same for both the government and Statoil; they have 
the same information about it. Hence, this uncertainty does not affect the results of this 
analysis. 
 
Assumption 2: The realized cost, C, are observable. However, the government can not 
disentangle the various components of cost. 
 
Assumption 3: Statoil can refuse to produce if the regulatory contract does not guarantee it a 
minimum level of expected utility. 
This forces the government to respect a participation constraint. I let U denote the Statoil’s 
expected utility. To make Statoil accept the contract, they must be made at least as better off 
than when choosing to abandon the project. This constraint becomes 
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 U ≥ 0. 
 
Assumption 4: The regulator can operate money transfers to the firm.  
In this case, this means that the competition restrictions from having an agreement with the 
European Union do not keep the Norwegian government from financing parts of this project. 
 
Assumption 5: Statoil and the government are risk neutral with respect to income.  
Statoil is a large firm involved in many projects. They might be risk averse when it comes to 
their total revenue, but risk neutral in each project as their risk is minimised through the 
involvement in many, different projects. The government is likely to be risk neutral. 
 
Assumption 7: The firm cares about income and effort only.  
The utility function can be written like this 
U = t – ψ(e).   
where t is the transfer received from the government, and ψ(e) denotes the disutility of effort. 
Effort is costly, ψ’(e), and the cost of effort is convex; ψ’’(e). For technical reasons: ψ’’’≥ 0. 
Statoil’s objectives would be to minimize their costs, but also obtain experience and know-
how. This last objective will not be inconsistent with this simple utility function, as this will 
be fulfilled in any case by this project, independent of the contract’s structure.  
 
Assumption 8: The regulator faces a shadow cost of public funds λ > 0. This is because the 
money spent by the government is raised through distortionary taxes. 
 
Assumption 9: The regulator’s objective is to maximize total surplus in society. 
This is a ‘benevolent regulator assumption’ that unlike my discussion about the political 
difficulties in chapter 2 neglects the fact that politicians might have other objectives, like 
maximizing the likelihood for being re-elected. Another thing the government has claimed is 
that they want the technology and the experience obtained to help reducing the future costs 
and uncertainties of CCS, to make it easier for others to implement as a mitigation strategy. I 
will not try to include this in the utility function: I will assume that the realization itself of 
this project will help promoting this. 
 
Assumption 10: The regulator designs the regulatory contract.   
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4.2.2.2. Incentive schemes 
A typical procurement contract has the government reimburse a fraction b (0 ≤ b ≤ 1) of the 
firm’s monetary expenditure C. The government has two goals: promote cost reduction and 
extract the firm’s rent. The government pays the firm’s cost and then pays a net transfer to 
the firm: 
t = a – bC 
where a is a ‘fixed fee’ and b is the fraction of the costs born by the firm, and thus the power 
of the incentive scheme.  
There are two common polar cases of such linear schemes: 
1. The cost-plus contract (b = 0). The firm does not bear any of its costs. The cost-plus 
contract is an extremely low-powered incentive scheme. At the same time, the government is 
extracting all of the firm’s rent, and will benefit from all exogenous factors reducing the 
costs. 
2. The fixed price contract (b = 1). The firm is residual claimant for its cost savings. The 
government does not reimburse any of the costs; it pays only a fixed fee. The fixed-price 
contract is an extremely high-powered incentive scheme. However, the government will not 
be able to extract any rent from the firm. 
 
In between the two extremes, we have incentive contracts with b strictly between 0 and 1. 
Real-world contracts are often linear, but some have nonlinear features such as a ceiling on 
transfers from the government.    
 
If the government and Statoil have the same knowledge about Statoil’s technology parameter 
(moral hazard but no adverse selection), the optimal regulatory contract is a fixed-price 
contract. The fixed fee is optimally set at the lowest level consistent with Statoil’s 
participation provided that they choose the cost-minimizing effort, that is, the effort that 
minimizes C + ψ(e). 
 
When Statoil has private information about the technology parameter as well, optimal 
contracts are incentive contracts trading off effort inducement, which calls for a fixed-price 
contract, and rent extraction, which calls for a cost-plus contract. It can be shown that it is 
optimal for the government to offer a menu of incentive contracts. If a firm could be either 
efficient or inefficient, the inefficient firm should not be given the same contract as an 
efficient firm. 
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4.2.2.3. The model 
The variables: 
 C  the cost of the CCS project 
 β  the efficiency parameter  
 e Statoil’s effort 
 U Statoil’s utility function 
 ψ(e) Statoil’s disutility from exerting effort with ψ’ > 0 and ψ’’> 0 for e > 0 
t transfer from the government to Statoil 
 λ shadow cost of public funds 
 S value of the CCS project for consumers 
 
The cost function of the CCS project is assumed to be 
(1) C = β – e   
Statoil’s utility level can be written as 
(2) U = t – ψ(e) 
which implies this participation constraint 
 (3) t – ψ(e) ≥ 0. 
The net surplus of consumers/taxpayers is 
 (4) S – (1 + λ)(t + β - e), 
leaving the government with an ex post social welfare  
 (5) S – (1 + λ)(t + β +-e) + t – ψ(e). 
Adding and subtracting (1 + λ)ψ(e), this can be rewritten as 
 (5) S – (1 + λ)[β – e – ψ(e)] – λU. 
4.2.2.4. The complete information case 
Under complete information – with both β and e observable to both parties – the government 
would make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to Statoil solving 
 (6) max {U,e} { S – (1 + λ)[β – e – ψ(e)] – λU } 
subject to U ≥ 0. 
The solution of this program is  
 (7) ψ’(e) = 1   or e ≡ e*   
which indicates that the marginal disutility of effort, ψ’(e), must be equal to marginal cost 
savings, 1, and  
 (8) U = 0 or  t = ψ(e) 
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which indicates that the firm should receive no rent because of the existence of a shadow 
cost of public funds. 
In this case, the government could offer a fixed-price contract: 
 t(C) = a – (C – C*) 
where a ≡ ψ(e*) and C* ≡ β - e*. 
As Statoil is residual claimant, they would choose the level of effort that maximizes t(C), 
which is e*. Their utility is then U = 0. 
Note that this contract shows that the government need not observe effort. As long as they 
know β, they can infer effort e = β – C from the observation of costs. 
4.2.2.5. The two-type case 
Now, I assume that the government knows that β, which characterizes Statoil’s technological 
possibilities, and thus Statoil’s type, can take two values: β1 or β2. In realistic to assume that 
the government has knowledge about an interval of values that β might take, but I choose to 
consider the two-type case for simplicity. The inefficient type that gives high costs, β2, is 
larger than β1. Let Δβ ≡ β2 - β1. 
The government observes the costs C and makes a net transfer t to Statoil. A contract 
between the two parties can be based on these jointly observed variables, one for each type 
of technology parameter: t(β1), C(β1) for the efficient, and t(β2), C(β2) for the inefficient. Let 
t1 ≡ t(β1) and t2 ≡ t(β2), and C1 ≡ C(β1) and C2 ≡ C(β2). Let U(β) ≡ t(β) – ψ(β - C(β)) denote 
the utility or rent of type β when it selects the transfer-cost pair designed for it. This gives U1 
≡ t1 – ψ(β1 – C1) for the efficient and U2 ≡ t2 – ψ(β2 – C2) for the inefficient type. 
Incentive compatibility says that the contract designed for type β1 is the one preferred by this 
type, and vice versa. Remembering that (1) C = β – e, the incentive compatibility constrains 
amounts to 
(9) t1 – ψ(β1 – C1) ≥ t2 – ψ(β1 – C2) 
(10) t2 – ψ(β2 – C2) ≥ t1 – ψ(β2 – C1) 
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where (9) says that it should not be profitable for the efficient type to pretend to be 
inefficient and (10) says that it should not be profitable for the inefficient type to pretend to 
be efficient. 
The participation constraints for each type amounts to 
 (11) U1 ≥ 0 
 (12) U2 ≥ 0 
It can be shown that since the efficient type always can mimic the inefficient one at a lower 
cost, (11) can be ignored. This leaves the participation constraint for the inefficient type to 
be only one that has to be taken into account. 
The ex post social welfare when Statoil has type β becomes 
W(β) = S – (1 + λ)[t(β) + C(β)] +  t(β) – ψ(β – C(β)) 
         = S - (1 + λ)[C(β) + ψ(β – C(β))] - λU(β) 
The government has a prior distribution on the values of β characterized by v = Pr(β = β1) 
and selects the contract that maximizes expected social welfare W ≡ vW(β1) + (1 - v)W(β1) 
under the incentive compatibility and participation constraints. When doing this, (10) can be 
neglected. It can be shown that the solution of the maximization problem will satisfy this. 
Hence, only the participation constraint for the inefficient type, (12), and the incentive 
compatibility constraint for the efficient one, (9), are retained. The latter can be rewritten  
 U1 ≥ t2 – ψ(β1 – C2) 
       ≥ U2 + Ф(e1) 
where Ф(e) ≡ ψ(e) - ψ(e - Δβ) and e1 ≡ β1 - C1. Since ψ’’> 0, Ф(·) is increasing. This 
function plays a crucial role in what follows. It determines the rent of the efficient type of 
firm (relative to the inefficient type) by measuring the economy in disutility of effort 
associated with a better technology. The implication of the property Ф(·) is increasing is that 
Statoil derives more informational rents under a high-powered incentive scheme (inducing 
high effort) than under a low-powered one.  
The government’s optimization problem is  
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(13) max {C1,C2,U1,U2} {v[S - (1 + λ)[C1 + ψ(β1 – C1)] – λU1] + (1 - v)[S - (1 + λ)[C2 +     
ψ(β2 – C2)] – λU2]} 
subject to (9) and (12). Since the rents U(β) are costly to the government, these constraints 
will be binding at the optimum. Substituting U2 = 0 and U1 = Ф(β1 - C1), we obtain 
 (14) ψ’(β1 – C1) = 1  or  e1 = e* 
 (15) ψ’(β2 – C2) = 1 – (λ /(1 + λ))(v/(1 - v))Ф’(β2 – C2), implying that e2 < e*. 
4.2.2.6. Results 
For S large enough, that ensures that it is worth realizing the project even if Statoil is of the 
inefficient type, and ψ’’’≥ 0, the optimal regulation under incomplete information is 
characterized by (14) and (15). It entails  
- an efficient level of effort and a positive rent for Statoil if efficient 
- undereffort and no rent for Statoil if inefficient 
The ability of the efficient type to mimic the inefficient type forces the regulator to give up a 
rent to the efficient type if they wish to have an active inefficient type.  The rent Ф(e1) is a 
function of the effort level required from the inefficient type. If the regulator were to insist 
on the first-best level of effort, or C2 = β2 - e*, the result would be a high rent for the 
efficient type since Ф’> 0. To reduce the costly rent, the regulator lowers the effort level 
requested from the inefficient type.  
By offering a fixed-price contract that ensures e1 = e* and an incentive contract that ensures 
e2 < e*, the government could make the best out of the agreement, given the existence of the 
asymmetric information problem. 
In general, asymmetric information forces the regulator to give up costly rent to their agents. 
To mitigate these costs, allocations are distorted away from first-best allocations and toward 
low-powered schemes. These distortions constitute the regulatory response to the asymmetry 
of information. 
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4.2.2.7. Discussion  
It might seem tempting for the government to require the appropriate effort level if it 
observes that Statoil chooses the contract constructed for the inefficient type. However, this 
would be in conflict with the assumption that an enforceable contract can be made, and 
would not be consistent with the analysis. The contract for the inefficient type is constructed 
such that U = 0, which implies that requiring more costly effort from Statoil would leave 
them with U < 0, and make them break the contract. 
To avoid giving up rents to the efficient type, the regulator can decide to go ahead with the 
project only if the cost is sufficiently low, which implies to only offer a contract designed for 
the efficient type. This would be an alternative if the S is not too high. Here, this means to 
offer a contract {t = ψ(e*), C = β1 - e*}, and extract all the rents from the efficient type as it 
can no longer mimic the inefficient one. This would lead to a cancellation of the CCS project 
at Mongstad if Statoil does not have an efficient technology. Given the political difficulties 
when it comes to this project, this does not seem to be a realistic alternative. 
Note that the optimal cost-reimbursement rule still requires substantial information. This 
might explain why we do not observe regulators offering menus of contracts in practice.  
4.3  The actual contract 
The actual contract is not optimal according to the previous analysis. First, only one contract 
is offered Statoil, and not a menu of contracts as the model suggested. However, only the 
final contract signed by Statoil is an official document, and not the bargaining process that 
gave rise to the contract.    
 
The technology and the corresponding budgeted costs of the carbon capture facility at 
Mongstad will be agreed upon by the two parties after the contract is signed, but before the 
building starts. The government will pay for the investment costs of the carbon capture 
facility. Statoil will contribute with the amount corresponding to the CO2 cost of their 
emissions. This cost will not depend on the total costs of the project at all. In addition, if the 
total costs exceed the budget, Statoil has to pay these exceeding costs. This means that 
Statoil has to undertake no risk up to a certain threshold, and all of the risk thereafter. This 
means that the contract is a cost-plus contract with a ceiling on the transfers from the 
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government. Consequently, Statoil will have full incentives to avoid the costs from 
exceeding the budget, but no incentives to minimize the costs further.  
 
Although this ceiling might resemble a fixed-price contract, it might have a perverse effect 
because Statoil could have the incentives to maximize the budgeted investment cost, or 
choose the technology they are most familiar with and have the most private information 
about. If they are better informed than the government, they would like to maximize the 
difference between what they consider to be the expected costs, and what they can convince 
the government to be the expected costs. This is to minimize the likelihood of having to pay 
for exceeding costs.  
 
For example, let Statoil have the choice between two technologies that have the same 
expected costs, but one is riskier and has a larger Δβ. Statoil would then choose the least 
risky technology: the expected costs for them will not be the same since they will not benefit 
from the reduced costs if the technology turns out to be very efficient, but suffer from the 
extra costs if it turns out to be inefficient. This would also be true for two technologies with 
differing expected costs, where the expected costs of the risky one is the lowest. The 
government would have wanted the risky technology to be chosen, but Statoil will not 
choose this. 
 
A technology company will be established and will run a test centre for various carbon 
capture technologies. Statoil will own 20 %, the remaining 80 % will be guaranteed by the 
government, by direct ownership and/or by recruiting other firms to join. The technology 
company can be thought of as a way to reduce Statoil’s private information about this 
project. In the model discussed above, this could translate into reducing Δβ .The experience 
will be shared between the firms involved in this company. This might be compatible with 
the government’s vision of making this available, but might not be in Statoil’s interest. They 
will not be the only firm gaining this experience, and will be less able to extract rent from 
the government because of the asymmetric information about β. 
 
Any revenue from a potential CO2 value chain will be deducted from the government’s 
costs. Considering the potential problems with such a value chain as discussed in chapter 
4.1., it might have been a good idea to let Statoil benefit from such revenues, giving them 
more incentives to coordinate their projects with other firms. 
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5. Conclusion 
Whether this project should be carried out or not, is difficult to say and to do so is not the 
intention of this thesis. I have shown that this depends on the costs of carbon capture and 
storage compared to other mitigation strategies, and how steep the learning curve of this new 
and uncertain technology is. The question is whether investing in CCS will bring down the 
future costs enough to defend the choice of such a costly mitigation strategy.  
 
The existence of information asymmetry, and therefore lack of incentives to invest in CCS is 
one of the factors that might justify the governmental involvement in this project, as I 
discussed in chapter 4.1. The very existence of information asymmetry and incentive 
problems, however, might keep the project from being carried out in an efficient manner, as I 
discussed in chapter 4.2. 
 
In reality, it is difficult to predict where the asymmetry lies, and hence what policy will be 
the most effective. Even though the actual contract does not leave Statoil completely without 
incentives, a better contract could probably be made by making Statoil’s contribution more 
dependent on total costs.   
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Appendix 1: Assumptions and calculations 
Most data and assumption are taken from Reinaud, 2003, with the exception of fuel-prices, 
taken from IEA 2006, and the CCS assumptions, which are taken from IPCC, 2005.  
Input data used: 
 Thermal  Fuel  Economic Variable  Fixed  Investment Carbon 
 Efficiency price plant life O&M costs O&M costs costs content 
 % €/GJ yrs €cents/kWh €cents/kWh €/MW tC/TJ 
Existing coal-fired plant 37 1,7  0,33 0,23  25,8 
New coal-fired plant 40 1,7 30 0,33 0,23 1100 25,8 
Existing gas-fired plant 49 3,5  0,15 0,35  15,3 
New gas-fired plant 55 3,5 25 0,15 0,35 500 15,3 
        
Discount rate 7 %       
Plant availability 80 %       
 
Fuel prices: 
Coal price:  1.7 €/GJ 
Gas price: 4.5 €/GJ 
Explanations to the formulas in the following spread sheet: 
Fuel cost = (fuel price at plant*conversion GJ to MWh 3,6)/thermal efficiency 
Amount of CO2 emitted = (emission rate for coal* conversion TJ to MWh 0,0036*conversion rate C to CO2 
(44/12))/thermal efficiency 
CO2 cost = amount of CO2 emitted*CO2 price 
Cost of capital = ((capital costs/plant capacity)*annuity)/(hours a year 8750*plant availability) 
Annuity = r/(1-(1/(1+r)n )) 
SRMC (short run marginal cost or ex post cost) = fuel cost + variable O&M cost (+ CO2 cost) 
LRMC (long run marginal cost or ex ante cost) = fuel cost + variable O&M cost + fixed O&M cost + cost of 
capital (+CO2 cost) 
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Copy of spread sheet I used to calculate marginal costs: 
Coal-Fired Power Plants
Without CCS
SHORT RUN - EX POST
Fuel price at plant €/GJ 1,70
Fuel cost €/MWh 16,54
Variable O&M cost €/MWh 3,33
Thermal efficiency % 37 %
SRMC (no CO2 price) /MWh 19,87
Emission rate for coal tC/TJ 25,8
Amount of CO2 emitted tCO2/MWh 0,92
CO2 price €/t 100
CO2 cost €/MWh 92,04
SRMC with CO2 price) /MWh 111,91
LONG RUN - EX ANTE
Plant capacity MW 740
Capital costs € 825000000
Economic Plant Life - n yrs 30
Plant availability % 80 %
Fuel Price €/GJ 1,70
Fuel Costs €/MWh 15,30
Cost of Capital €/MWh 12,83
Variable O&M Costs €/MWh 3,33
Fixed O&M Costs €/MWh 3,50
Thermal efficiency % 40 %
Annuity/pretax return % 8,06 %
Depreciation €/MWh 5,23
LRMC (no CO2 price) /MWh 34,96
Amount of CO2 emitted tCO2/MWh 0,8514
CO2 price €/t 100
CO2 cost €/MWh 85,14
LRMC (with CO2 price) /MWh 120,10  
 
 
 
 
 
Results from spread sheet: marginal costs at various CO2 prices without CCS: 
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CO2 prices:
Fuel price: 0 20 50 100
Existing coal-fired plant 1,7 1,99 3,83 6,59 11,19
Existing gas-fired plant 4,5 3,46 4,28 5,52 7,58
New coal-fired plant 1,7 3,5 5,2 7,75 12,01
New gas-fired plant 4,5 3,94 4,68 5,78 7,61  
CCS assumptions: 
   EC EG* NC  NG 
Capture costs CCS 3,50 4,00 1,30 1,50 
* as the capture cost for existing gas-fired plants was not given in the IPPC report, I added a 
cost based on my own assumption: I assume that since since it is more expensive to retrofit an 
existing plant, and that CCS on gas-fired plants is more expensive than on coal-fired ones, it 
is reasonable to assume that . I took the cost of new gas-fired plants, and added a extra cost 
equivalent to the percentage difference in costs between new and existing coal plants. 
    Mid-point:   
 $/tCO2 €/tCO2** €cents/tCO2 €cents/tCO2   
Transportation costs  0 - 5  0 - 3,9 0 - 390 200   
Geological storage  0,6 - 8,3  0,5 - 6,4 50 - 640 350   
** Assumption: 1 € = 1,3 $ 
      
I've used the last column in my analysis;      
this corresponds to a mid-point of the range of costs reported in IPCC 2005. 
Emissions Emissions Tr.cost St.cost EOR Total (geo)
tCO2/MWh tCO2/kWh €cents/kWh €cents/kWh €cents/kWh €cents/kWh
Existing coal-fired plant 0,18 0,00018409 0,04 0,06 -0,18 0,1
New coal-fired plant 0,17 0,00017028 0,03 0,06 -0,17 0,09
Existing gas-fired plant 0,08 8,24E-05 0,02 0,03 -0,08 0,05
New gas-fired plant 0,07 0,00007344 0,01 0,03 -0,07 0,04   
EC EG NC NG
Increased cost w/  CCS* 3,50 4,00 1,30 1,50
Transport + geo. storage 0,10 0,05 0,09 0,04
Total w/  geo. storage 3,60 4,05 1,39 1,54  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CCS: new marginal costs at different CO2-prices: 
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CO2 prices: 0 20 50 100
Existing coal-fired plant
MC no CCS/no CO2 price 1,99 1,99 1,99 1,99
CO2-cost w/  CCS 0,00 0,37 0,92 1,84
Increased cost w/  CCS 3,60 3,60 3,60 3,60
MC with CCS 5,59 5,96 6,51 7,43
Existing gas-fired plant
MC no CCS/no CO2 price 2,72 2,72 2,72 2,72
CO2-cost w/  CCS 0,00 0,16 0,41 0,82
Increased cost w/CCS 4,05 4,05 4,05 4,05
MC with CCS 6,77 6,93 7,18 7,59
New coal-fired plant
MC no CCS/no CO2 price 3,50 3,50 3,50 3,50
CO2-cost w/  CCS 0,00 0,34 0,85 1,70
Increased cost w/  CCS* 1,39 1,39 1,39 1,39
MC with CCS 4,89 5,23 5,74 6,59
New gas-fired plant
MC no CCS/no CO2 price 3,29 3,29 3,29 3,29
CO2-cost w/  CCS 0,00 0,15 0,37 0,73
Increased cost w/  CCS* 1,54 1,54 1,54 1,54
MC with CCS 4,83 4,98 5,20 5,56  
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Appendix 2: List of abbreviations and symbols 
CCS  carbon capture and storage 
CO2  carbon dioxide 
EOR   enhanced oil recovery 
EC   Existing coal-fired plant 
EG    Existing gas-fired plant 
EC CCS  Existing coal-fired plant with CCS  
EG CCS  Existing gas-fired plant with CCS 
EU ETS European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme 
IEA   International Energy Agency 
IPCC  International Panel on Climate change 
kWh  kilowatt hours 
NC   New coal-fired plant 
NC CCS  New coal-fired plant with CCS 
NG   New gas-fired plant 
NG CCS   New gas-fired with CCS 
NPD  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
NVE  Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 
O&M  operation and maintenance 
tCO2  ton carbon dioxide 
TJ  terrajoule 
WEC   World Energy Council 
C   the cost of the CCS project 
β   the efficiency parameter  
e  Statoil’s effort 
U  Statoil’s utility function 
ψ(e)  Statoil’s disutility from exerting effort  
t  transfer from the government to Statoil 
λ  shadow cost of public funds 
S  value of the CCS project for consumers 
v  probability of high efficiency parameter 
  
